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tcpd (8)
  • >> tcpd (8) ( Solaris man: Команды системного администрирования )
  • tcpd (8) ( FreeBSD man: Команды системного администрирования )
  • tcpd (8) ( Linux man: Команды системного администрирования )
  • 
    NAME
         tcpd - access control facility for internet services
    
    DESCRIPTION
         The tcpd program can be set up to monitor incoming  requests
         for telnet, finger, ftp, exec, rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, com-
         sat and other services that have a one-to-one  mapping  onto
         executable files.
    
         The program supports both 4.3BSD-style  sockets  and  System
         V.4-style TLI.  Functionality may be limited when the proto-
         col underneath TLI is not an internet protocol.
    
         Operation is as follows:  whenever  a  request  for  service
         arrives,  the  inetd daemon is tricked into running the tcpd
         program instead of the desired server. tcpd logs the request
         and does some additional checks. When all is well, tcpd runs
         the appropriate server program and goes away.
    
         Optional features are: pattern-based access control,  client
         username  lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection
         against hosts that pretend to have someone elses host  name,
         and  protection  against  hosts that pretend to have someone
         elses network address.
    
    LOGGING
         Connections that are monitored by tcpd are reported  through
         the  syslog(3)  facility. Each record contains a time stamp,
         the client host name and the name of the requested  service.
         The information can be useful to detect unwanted activities,
         especially when logfile information from  several  hosts  is
         merged.
    
         In order to find out where your logs are going, examine  the
         syslog configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf.
    
    ACCESS CONTROL
         Optionally, tcpd supports a simple form  of  access  control
         that  is  based  on  pattern  matching.   The access-control
         software provides hooks for the execution of shell  commands
         when  a pattern fires.  For details, see the hosts_access(5)
         manual page.
    
    HOST NAME VERIFICATION
         The authentication scheme of some  protocols  (rlogin,  rsh)
         relies  on host names. Some implementations believe the host
         name that they get from any random name server; other imple-
         mentations are more careful but use a flawed algorithm.
    
         tcpd verifies the client host name that is returned  by  the
         address->name  DNS  server  by  looking at the host name and
         address that are returned by the name->address  DNS  server.
         If  any  discrepancy  is detected, tcpd concludes that it is
         dealing with a host that pretends to have someone elses host
         name.
    
         If the sources are compiled with -DPARANOID, tcpd will  drop
         the  connection  in  case  of  a host name/address mismatch.
         Otherwise, the hostname can be  matched  with  the  PARANOID
         wildcard, after which suitable action can be taken.
    
    HOST ADDRESS SPOOFING
         Optionally, tcpd disables source-routing socket  options  on
         every  connection that it deals with. This will take care of
         most attacks from hosts that pretend to have an address that
         belongs  to someone elses network. UDP services do not bene-
         fit from this protection. This feature must be turned on  at
         compile time.
    
    RFC 931
         When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time  option)
         tcpd  will attempt to establish the name of the client user.
         This will succeed only if the client host runs an  RFC  931-
         compliant  daemon.   Client  user name lookups will not work
         for datagram-oriented connections, and may cause  noticeable
         delays in the case of connections from PCs.
    
    EXAMPLES
         The details of using tcpd  depend  on  pathname  information
         that was compiled into the program.
    
    EXAMPLE 1
         This example applies when tcpd  expects  that  the  original
         network daemons will be moved to an "other" place.
    
         In order to monitor access to the finger service,  move  the
         original finger daemon to the "other" place and install tcpd
         in the place of the original finger daemon. No  changes  are
         required to configuration files.
    
              # mkdir /other/place
              # mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd /other/place
              # cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd
    
         The  example  assumes  that  the  network  daemons  live  in
         /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin
         or in /usr/libexec, or have no `in.' prefix to their name.
    
    EXAMPLE 2
         This example applies when tcpd expects that the network dae-
         mons are left in their original place.
    
         In order to monitor access to the  finger  service,  perform
         the following edits on the inetd configuration file (usually
         /etc/inetd.conf or /etc/inet/inetd.conf):
    
              finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /usr/etc/in.fingerd  in.fingerd
    
         becomes:
    
              finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /some/where/tcpd     in.fingerd
    
    
         The  example  assumes  that  the  network  daemons  live  in
         /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin
         or in /usr/libexec, the daemons  have  no  `in.'  prefix  to
         their  name, or there is no userid field in the inetd confi-
         guration file.
    
         Similar changes will be needed for the other  services  that
         are  to  be  covered  by  tcpd.   Send  a `kill -HUP' to the
         inetd(8) process to make the changes  effective.  AIX  users
         may also have to execute the `inetimp' command.
    
    EXAMPLE 3
         In the case of daemons that do not live in a  common  direc-
         tory  ("secret"  or otherwise), edit the inetd configuration
         file so that it specifies an absolute path name for the pro-
         cess name field. For example:
    
             ntalk  dgram  udp  wait  root  /some/where/tcpd  /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
    
    
         Only the last component (ntalkd) of  the  pathname  will  be
         used for access control and logging.
    
    BUGS
         Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a  while  after
         they have finished their work, in case another request comes
         in.  In the inetd  configuration  file  these  services  are
         registered  with  the  wait  option.  Only  the request that
         started such a daemon will be logged.
    
         The program does not work with RPC services over TCP.  These
         services  are  registered as rpc/tcp in the inetd configura-
         tion file. The only non-trivial service that is affected  by
         this limitation is rexd, which is used by the on(1) command.
         This is no great loss.  On most systems, rexd is less secure
         than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv.
    
         RPC broadcast requests (for  example:  rwall,  rup,  rusers)
         always appear to come from the responding host. What happens
         is that the client broadcasts the  request  to  all  portmap
         daemons  on  its  network;  each portmap daemon forwards the
         request to a local daemon. As far as the rwall etc.  daemons
         know, the request comes from the local host.
    
    FILES
         The default locations of the host access control tables are:
    
         /etc/hosts.allow
         /etc/hosts.deny
    
    SEE ALSO
         hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables.
         syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file.
         inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file.
    
    AUTHORS
         Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl),
         Department of Mathematics and Computing Science,
         Eindhoven University of Technology
         Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
         5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
    
    
    
    


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