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"IETF стандартизирует протокол сквозного шифрования MLS" Отправлено Аноним, 30-Мрт-23 21:43
> Прочитать что в ОРИГИНАЛЕ написано - скрепы не позволяют ? Это в том числе и к вам вопрос. У вас есть номера CVE, а вы не можете посмотреть чем они вызваны. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24588 >The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24587 >The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24586 >The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data. Достаточно оригинально?

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Сообщение*:	>> Прочитать что в ОРИГИНАЛЕ написано - скрепы не позволяют ? > Это в том числе и к вам вопрос. У вас есть номера > CVE, а вы не можете посмотреть чем они вызваны. > https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24588 >>The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. > https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24587 >>The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed. > https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24586 >>The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data. > Достаточно оригинально?
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