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X-RDate: Sun, 15 Mar 1998 14:39:21 +0500 (ESK) Date: Fri, 13 Mar 1998 13:34:27 +0100 (CET) From: Arnold Hendriks <unilynx@core.dumped.org> To: linux-security@redhat.com Subject: [linux-security] Re: Re: Towards a solution of tmp-file problems (fwd) Allen Bolderoff wrote... > or have the kernel create a virtual filesystem that doesn't allow > symlinks/hardlinks? > IMHO, the only solution is going to be kernel based in this manner. There might be reasons for wanting symlinks inside /tmp. An additional mount option to not follow symlinks that cross devices can solve our problem here (and might be useful for other things too) Simply creating a 100mb-or-so partition for /tmp, and mount it with a (to-be-kernel-supplied) "noxdevlink" option. Symlinks would be perfectly allowed on the /tmp directory (helps when untarring and compiling new software in /tmp which uses symlinks), but no symlinks would be allowed to cross filesystems. When /tmp is seperate, there would be no way to symlink /tmp to important /etc files, or anything else. Kernel would probably have to give EPERM (permission denied) on any attempt to follow a symlink crossing devices, if the symlink started on a no-symlink device. There would be no need for a new filesytem type, just a mount option. This probably could be managed before 2.2 (probably, not too sure of kernel internals) -- Arnold Hendriks -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Please refer to the information about this list as well as general information about Linux security at http://www.aoy.com/Linux/Security. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe: mail -s unsubscribe test-list-request@redhat.com < /dev/null
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